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INTRODuCTION
Digitalization has transformed many indus-
tries during the last decades. A growing 
number of companies operate as open eco-
systems that link users, extend across sec-
tors and harness network effects. In 2019, 
seven out of the world’s 10 largest corpora-
tions derive much of their value from multi-
sided platforms. Top-3 largest companies in 
this list are Apple, Microsoft and Amazon 
with market value of about a trillion U.S. 
dollars each [Statista, 2019a]. Network ef-
fects enable a rapid business growth. Many 
digital platform firms exceed comparable 
traditional firms by market capitalization, 
while the numbers of employees is much 
lower. For example, BMW was founded in 
1916 and as of 2018, its market capitaliza-
tion reached USD 51 bln. while the number 
of employees was 131 thousands. At the 
same time, Uber began its activities only in 
2009. Nevertheless, as of 2018 its market 
capitalization is even higher (USD 76 bln.) 
and the number of staff is much lower 
(16 thousands) as of 2018 [Jacobides, Sun-
dararajan, Van Alstyne, 2019].
Despite platforms are rather an old busi-
ness model, it has been updated to the pref-
erences of the participants in digital econ-
omy. Users prefer crowdsourcing and ask 
only for the best possible match for their 
needs for instead of looking for a particular 
seller.
At the same time, many antitrust deci-
sions and investigations of multi-sided plat-
forms have emerged. To illustrate the scale 
of potential harm created by multi-sided 
platforms we refer to the most high profile 
antitrust cases against MSPs which were 
undertaken by BRICS competition authori-
ties. It is not surprisingly that these are 
primarily cases against the world`s largest 
digital companies. The European Commission 
has imposed three massive fines on Google 
as result of a wide-ranging antitrust inves-
tigations. In 2017, Google was fined €2.4 bln. 
for abusing its market dominance as a search 
engine by giving an advantage to its own 
comparison shopping service [European 
Commission, 2017b]. The next year it was 
penalized even to a higher extent: a record 
€4.34 bln. fine for abusing its dominant po-
sition of its Android operating system in 
order to extend the coverage of Google’s 
search engine [Euro pean Commission, 2018]. 
A third fine appeared in March 2019, when 
European Com mission fined Google with 
a €1.49 bln. for blocking online advertising 
rivals [Euro pean Commission, 2019]. These 
fines have been calculated on the basis of 
the value of Google’s revenue from the rel-
evant operations in the countries concern-
ed.  Ne ver theless, even a comparison with 
Google’s revenue worldwide (USD 136 bln. 
in 2018, USD 110 bln. in 2017, USD 90 bln. 
in 2016 [Statista, 2019b]) indicates a huge 
scale of these fines.
Next important step in antitrust enforce-
ment against digital platforms was investi-
gation and decision of German competition 
authority Bundeskartellamt on the abuse of 
dominance by [Bundeskartellamt, 2019]. 
There are important features of this deci-
sion. First, mature competition jurisdiction 
establishes for the first time exploitative-
type abuse of dominance, that is an abuse 
where losses of consumer surplus but not 
restriction of competition is an evidence of 
competition rule violations. Second, compe-
tition authority stresses that exploitative 
abuses are possible in zero-pricing markets, 
where users obtain service “for free”.
Not only Google has been an object of 
antitrust investigations recently. In July 
2019, The U.S. Department of Justice an-
nounced a huge investigation into the Big 
Four Tech companies (Google, Facebook, 
Apple and Amazon), suspecting an engage-
ment in practices that have reduced compe-
tition, limited innovation and harmed con-
sumers [Kelly, 2019]. In another case, The 
Federal Trade Commission has approved 
fining Facebook for USD 5 bln. to settle an 
investigation into the company’s repeated 
privacy violations following the Cambridge 
Analytica revelations [The Guardian, 2019]. 
This fine would be the largest ever imposed 
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by the FTC against a technology company, 
since the company had more than USD 
15 bln. in revenue in the first three months 
of 2019 [The Guardian, 2019].
Interpretation of MSP’s conduct by com-
petition authorities is important. A plat-
form strategy is based on positive cross-
platform network effects, which allow par-
ticipants to benefit from the presence of 
others in contrast to a traditional compet-
itive strategy, when customers determine 
their willingness to pay independently. Stra-
tegies of MSPs may become targets of an-
titrust enforcement both because of the size 
of platforms and because their strategies 
may seem suspicious in the context of com-
petition legislation. According to [Van Al-
styne et al., 2016, p. 55], “the focus of 
strategy shifts from controlling to orches-
trating resources, from optimizing internal 
processes to facilitating external interac-
tions, and from increasing customer value 
to maximizing ecosystem value”. In terms 
of competition rules, orchestrating resourc-
es sufficient to provide network effect (in 
order to maximize ecosystem value) means 
dominance. Or che strat ing resources may 
imply restrictions on the use of competing 
platform (single-homing), and prevention 
of upgrading of users. Finally, a platform 
combines value creation for ecosystem with 
value extraction from ecosystem, and the 
latter may be considered under some cir-
cumstances as exploitative abuse of domi-
nance.
The development of business strategies 
in MSPs in the future will be limited by the 
standards that competition authorities will 
implement. This raises an important ques-
tion whether the techniques traditionally 
used to define markets, to assess market 
power and efficiencies, remain adequate for 
these purposes in the MSPs markets. For 
international digital platforms, standards 
that BRICS competition authorities apply 
are important as they limit boundaries of 
business strategies of digital platforms in 
the markets attractive because of large pop-
ulation.
Another important aspect is the similar-
ity or difference in approaches of antitrust 
authorities across countries, which is ex-
tremely relevant for global companies that 
are trying to maintain their presence in dif-
ferent markets. The position of the BRICS 
countries is especially of interest because: 
(1) they started investigations earlier; 
(2) they are traditionally reproached for ex-
cessive rigidity [Giannaccari, Van den Bergh, 
2017]. In the article, we, first, compare ap-
proaches of BRICS competition authorities 
towards multi-sided digital platforms with 
those of EU approach, and, second, approach-
es of the authorities in different BRICS 
countries.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze 
the theory of harm (explanation how and 
why specific conducts restrict competition 
and/or harm consumers) that BRICS com-
petition authorities apply in cases involving 
MSPs and determine how antitrust decisions 
restrict business models of MSPs in order 
to identify whether competition enforcement 
in BRICS may pose a serious threat to the 
development of business strategies of MSPs 
in BRICS markets. In our analysis, we con-
sider both transaction platforms (platforms 
that connect users to make a transaction) 
and non-transaction platforms (platforms 
in which different types of users do not in-
teract directly). For competition concerns, 
we consider concerns on competition of plat-
forms (that implies the right of a user to 
switch between platforms) and concerns on 
competition on platform (that requires the 
right of a user to access the resources ac-
cumulated by a platform).
The goal of section 1 is to describe and 
explain the approaches that BRICS compe-
tition authorities have taken so far towards 
MSPs. In section 2, we briefly recall the 
theory of entry and exclusion under net-
work effects. Section 3 summarizes impli-
cations from competition law and the eco-
nomics of MSPs for enforcement, taking 
into account specific BRICS conditions. 
Section 4 reviews theories of harm/com-
petition concerns that BRICS authorities 
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elaborate under enforcement, respective re-
medies and other instruments of competi tion 
policy. Section 5 concludes.
1. MuLTI-SIDED PLATFORMS: 
INCREASING ATTENTION  
OF COMPETITION POLICY
Multi-sided platforms (MSPs) are among 
the hot topics for managerial [Eisen mann, 
Parker, Van Alstyne, 2006] and economic 
[Rochet, Tirole, 2006] studies during at 
least the last two decades. Despite the fact 
that network externalities, both direct and 
indirect (or cross-platform)1, emerged and 
were studied in the pre-digital era, the im-
portance of the issue in the digital era sharp-
ly increased. The reason is the increasing 
opportunities for MSPs to exploit cross-
platform network externalities and obtain 
large profits in digital markets. Moreover, 
networks can form much faster than before.
In recent years, there has been a promi-
nent increase in the platform economy. In 
its “Technology Vision 2016” report, the 
global consulting firm Accenture argues that 
“unparalleled growth of the digital economy 
has put it on course to account for 25% of 
the world’s entire economy by 2020, up from 
15% in 2005. Platform business models rep-
resent a fast-increasing proportion of the 
overall total” [Walles, 2018].
Platform-based companies both create 
new markets and transform existing down-
stream markets. Big data represents a par-
ticular resource of platforms since it attracts 
the large number of customers. Processing 
of big data allows platforms to improve its 
own decision-making (e. g. to develop a price 
discrimination scheme) or to improve ser-
1 In the literature, two types of cross-platform 
effects are discussed. The direct network effect 
appears when user’s benefit from a platform is di-
rectly affected by the number of users [Katz, Sha-
piro, 1985]. The indirect network effect means that 
users on one side of a platform benefit from an 
increase of the number of users on the other side 
of a platform [Armstrong, 2006].
vices for customers (e. g. targeted advertis-
ing). Big data may result in a more efficient 
management of resources that could provide 
annual net savings of up to €600 bln. for 
EU enterprises. Digital platforms may cap-
ture 30 –40% of the value created in the 
industrial chain2.
However, along with the enhanced re-
source efficiency, the large size of MSPs 
may cause a strong impact on competition 
in platform and downstream markets3. In 
their value chains, large MSPs act as dom-
inant players (“lead” firms in the sense used 
by the theory of global value chain) [Gereffi, 
Humphrey, Sturgeon, 2005]. Governance in 
value chains represents not only rule-setting 
and enforcement but also reallocation of 
value created in the value chain in favor of 
the dominant participant. The share of val-
ue distributed towards independent par-
ticipants in downstream markets may de-
crease. This suggests that competition ana-
2 The forecast [European Commission, 2016] 
uses as an assumption that most European compa-
nies use digital resources at the level that their 
competitors on the digital frontier already use. 
Increasing the share of value added comprises new 
transactions generated by the platforms, replace-
ment of the less efficient instruments of advertis-
ing, planning, logistics by more efficient ones, and 
the development of new products and services that 
would be available by digitalization (for instance, 
within the area of the Internet of Things).
3 The extensive literature on the impact of MSPs 
on downstream markets does not fully support ex-
pectations of anticompetitive influence on down-
stream markets. On the one hand, previous studies 
[Schmalensee, 1981; Whinston, 1990] have exam-
ined entry in complementary markets, but with-
out focusing particularly on platform dynamics or 
cross-platform effects. These authors suggest that 
monopolists have several strong incentives for en-
tering complementary markets to offer bundling 
or tying. On the other hand, other papers [Farrell, 
Katz, 2000; Becchetti, Paganetto, 2001] show that 
if a monopolist cannot duplicate the entrants’ in-
novations at a reasonable cost, then it may have 
strong incentives to try to state to entrants that 
it will not enter the market for complements to 
stimulate the competitive efforts of independent 
suppliers of the complementary product.
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lysis should look beyond the effects of ho-
rizontal competition on consumers or total 
welfare towards to include the influence of 
value chain design on the generation and 
distribution of value [Lianos, 2017]. In the 
latter dimension, one important issue is 
vertical competition as an ability of the par-
ticipants in the chain to upgrade and receive 
a fair part of the overall amount of value 
generated.
In many dimensions, conditions for suc-
cessful business models in MSPs are differ-
ent from related conditions in markets where 
network externalities are weak. The same is 
true for conditions that profit-maximizing 
decisions should satisfy. As a result, stan-
dards to identify anticompetitive conduct 
that competition authorities traditionally 
apply to one-sided markets (occasionally with 
important reservations) could be inappli-
cable for MSPs.
Recall the example of below-cost pricing. 
We already know that “horizontal” dynam-
ic economies of scale can lead to non-pred-
atory below-cost pricing. However, with 
MSPs, there is an additional issue: network 
effects between different sides of the plat-
form (“across the platform”) so that one can 
get below cost pricing on the sides where 
demand is more elastic. Such below cost 
prices do not reflect a predatory intent but 
they can have a predatory effect on firms 
which are not as “vertically” integrated as 
MSPs.
MSPs have the ability to unilaterally 
influence downstream markets, including 
pricing, product differentiation, and entry 
conditions. The influence of MSPs on hori-
zontal and adjacent markets might also be 
an ti competitive. Antitrust enforcers world-
wide focus closely on large MSPs, from 
Microsoft to Google [Evans, Noel, 2008; 
Haucap, Stühmeier, 2015]. However, in all 
these cases, the competitive analysis of MSP 
conduct4 can be tricky, for two main reasons. 
4 The best-known example is a dispute between 
different interpretations of Microsoft conduct when 
crowding Netscape out of the market for web-
Firstly, even if some conduct reduces hori-
zontal competition in a given market, cross-
platform effects can generate compensating 
benefits in another market. Secondly, dy-
namic efficiency, which is central to many 
MSPs’ business model further complicate 
the task [Katz, Shelanski, 2005]. Therefore, 
a necessary step of the analysis is to weigh 
losses from competition restrictions against 
welfare gains. This is especially important 
under the analysis of economic concentra-
tions.
Competition authorities in BRICS coun-
tries face the same problems when investi-
gating and deciding on the conduct of MSPs 
as their colleagues do in more developed ju-
risdictions. In recent years, they have made 
important decisions on abusive conduct of 
MSPs and on remedies required for the ap-
proval of economic concentrations. The de-
cisions of BRICS competition authorities 
have less extensively analyzed than their 
counterparts in the EU or the US. This is 
especially unfortunate as BRICS policy to-
wards digital MSPs might substantially di-
verge from that in the USA and Europe.
Important differences indeed arise be-
cause of BRICS’ desire to catch-up with more 
advanced economies. In most BRICS coun-
tries, initial steps in the development of 
domestic digital markets were made by glob-
al rather than domestic platforms. At the 
same time, countries explicitly stress the 
strategic objective to develop national digi-
tal innovation systems5 involving domestic 
suppliers of digital solutions, including ap-
plications and business models.
The influence of market demand in BRICS 
on the potential competition in digital value 
chains, governed by MSPs, is contradictory. 
On the one hand, large market volume in 
many cases allows for interplatform compe-
tition, even if a platform exhibits substantial 
browsers [Gilbert, Katz, 2001; Klein, 2001; Whin-
ston, 2001]. In the discussion, many arguments 
were developed in the “one-sided market” logic but 
at least taking into account direct network exter-
nalities.
5 See detailed description in the introduction.
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increasing returns to scale6. At the same 
time, large market volume makes a domes-
tic market attractive for global platforms, 
which then tend to dominate the local mar-
ket. Therefore, domestic competition autho-
rities may give special attention to the threat 
of foreclosure for domestic competitors and 
other forms of softening competition in fa-
vor of global MSPs, assigning higher weight 
to the gains of domestic competitors in de-
veloping theories of harm. In contrast, they 
may not take into account decreasing incen-
tives of global companies to innovate as 
a  negative externality of competition en-
forcement since the impact of their decisions 
on the investment policies of large global 
firms is likely to be minimal. Given this 
difference of perspective as well as the fact 
that mature jurisdictions have not elabo-
rated an unanimous approach to competition 
policy, the BRICS need to develop their own 
approach towards MSPs.
2. IMPLICATIONS  
OF THE ECONOMIC THEORY  
OF MuLTI-SIDED PLATFORMS  
FOR COMPETITION POLICY
2.1. Incentives to Enter and Market 
Structure of MSP
Competition policy addresses markets where 
demand and supply conditions make im-
perfect competition sustainable. A difficult 
task in these markets is to distinguish be-
tween market power that is explained by 
demand and supply and the conduct of 
6 UnionPay payment system is a successful new-
comer in the payment system markets with large 
cross-platform effects due to large scale; Russian 
MIR (“World”) is trying to achieve the same. In 
the Chinese market, there is intense competition 
between Alibaba and Tencent in many markets con-
nected by relevant MPSs. In the Moscow market 
of taxi aggregator services, there has recently been 
sharp competition between Yandex-Uber, Sitimobil 
(domestic company) and Gett, with substantial 
changes in market shares annually.
dominant companies that enhance market 
power.
In the presence of MSPs, this is espe-
cially difficult, as the economic theory of 
entry in the market with network effects 
shows. This theory for a one-sided market 
followed several important stages. The start-
ing point was that under high entry costs, 
entry deterrence could be achievable and 
profitable [Bain, 1956]: by choosing a price 
at which the entrant could not expect to 
cover the costs of entry, the incumbent could 
remain a monopolist. Anyway, it was criti-
cized for the assumption (called the Sylos-
Labini postulate [Sylos-Labini, 1957]) that 
a potential entrant considers price (or quan-
tity) set by the incumbent before entry as 
being unchanged after entry. If this assump-
tion is not true, then pre-entry price (quan-
tity) cannot predict the profit that a new 
entrant obtains in case of entry7.
However, these conclusions no longer hold 
in markets with network effects. Consider8 
a market for a network good with two sell-
ers — incumbent (I) with the installed base 
(measured by the number of users N) and 
entrant (E) with zero installed base. The 
unit cost of entrant is lower than that of 
incumbent cE < cI, and the entry cost of in-
cumbent is zero.
Consider highly dispersed users with unit 











. There are 
N old users who constitute the installed base 
of an incumbent, and they do not need to 
pay again for the good in a new period. Now, 
N new users enter the market. Assume that 
the entrant has unit costs cE which are 
7 Historically, this point was raised by Dixit 
[Dixit, 1980] in the dispute with Spence [Spence, 
1977].
8 The example presented further is based on 
[Karlinger, Motta, 2012]. In the model, there is 
only one network good sold by an incumbent, and 
that good potentially could be sold by an entrant. 
However, for the overall logic, only network exter-
nalities matter for the conclusion.
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lower than the unit costs cI of the incum-
bent. Further assume that if the incumbent 
is unable to discriminate between old and 
new users, there are two pure-strategy Nash-
equilibria. One is an entry equilibrium where 
the entrant sells at price P = cI – ε, incum-
bent sets price equal to unit cost, and all 
users buy from the entrant. Another is an 
exclusionary equilibrium when incumbent 
sells at price P = f(2N), entrant sets any 
price lower than incumbent, but all users 
buy from the incumbent. It follows that en-
try by a more efficient firm might be deterred 
even with zero entry cost and even though 
the incumbent charges the highest possible 
price. A customer does not gain from switch-
ing to a lower-price alternative if the posi-
tive network effect is sufficiently large. In-
deed, if the available network for entrant 
is small (F(2N) – F(N) > cI), no cost advan-
tage would be sufficient for successful entry.
An incumbent with a large enough in-
stalled base does not need to sacrifice any 
margin to prevent the entry of a potential 
competitor. The model explains why size 
itself may prevent entry and may weaken 
competition, even without any intention or 
special actions from the incumbent9. A mo-
nopoly structure of markets with large net-
work externalities may result from the cross-
platform effect itself.
This model has several implications for 
competition policy. The network effect is 
sufficient to explain the persistence of im-
perfect competition. Additional factors of 
cost and service advantages of a platform, 
including cost subadditivity, informational 
advantages because of data collected, or su-
perior prediction abilities, are not necessary 
to explain high concentration. This basic 
difference should be taken into account by 
competition enforcement, possibly justifying 
a specific approach.
9 The important part of the model is the expla-
nation of the impact of different degrees of price 
discrimination on the availability of exclusionary/
entry equilibrium. The authors show that under 
third- and second-degree price discrimination, on-
ly an exclusionary equilibrium is sustainable.
2.2. Impact of Network Externalities 
on the Effectiveness of Exclusionary 
Contracts
For many platform businesses, participants 
on either side can choose between single- or 
multi-homing. Single-homing might be eco-
nomically justified without any special con-
tract terms or might result from contract 
clauses proposed by MSPs, explicitly requir-
ing single-homing or making it de facto 
preferable by providing steep quantity or 
loyalty discounts. In the latter case, the ef-
fects of single-homing should be analyzed 
through the lens of the theory of vertical 
restraints.
Historically, the so-called Chicago school 
provided important challenges to all the 
theories of exclusionary conduct under ra-
tional decisions of users and incumbents. 
A conventional presentation of the Chicago 
paradox [Rasmusen, Ramseyer, Wiley, 1991] 
is that if after entry an incumbent and an 
entrant with identical unit costs compete 
a la Bertrand (with equilibrium prices there-
fore equal to margin-al costs), any exclusion-
ary contract under a price higher than mar-
ginal cost cannot be supported in a Nash 
equilibrium. There is a wide range of post-
Chicago models of vertical restraints, which 
identify conditions that make equilibrium 
with exclusionary contracts possible. The 
models include incomplete information on 
the cost function of a potential entrant [Ag-
hion, Bolton, 1987], imperfect competition 
after entry and specifically important for 
MSPs — miscoordination between users [Ras-
musen, Ramseyer, Wiley, 1991].
The incentives and ability of MSPs to 
impose exclusivity clauses is greater than 
for single-sided businesses [Amelio, Kar lin-
ger, Valletti, 2018]. Firstly, when a platform 
binds the users on one side (call it side A) 
with an exclusionary agreement, positive 
cross-platform (indirect) network external-
ities increase demand and willingness to pay 
on another side (call it side B). This makes 
it easier to compensate users on side A to 
prevent their profitable deviation from the 
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exclusionary contract. As Armstrong and 
Wright stress [Armstrong, Wright, 2007], 
exclusivity in this case substantially affects 
the distribution of surplus across subgroups 
of users on either side because, under multi-
homing, MSPs compete for the users who 
are multi-homers, extracting the surplus 
from those who are single-homers. Com-
petition forces lower prices for multi-hom-
ers (as their demand becomes more elastic 
due to the Rochet-Tirole condition), but 
higher prices for single-homers.
Several remarks are important here. 
First, the redistribution of surplus between 
different sides of platform does not provide 
clear-cut criteria to identify a competition-
weakening effect as the pattern is similar 
to the rule for pure short-term profit max-
imization is similar — increase the price-
cost margin for the side with low demand 
elasticity and “subsidize” the side with high 
elasticity of demand. Second, exclusivity, 
or single-homing, is not necessarily welfare-
decreasing. It might be welfare-enhancing 
(and competition-preserving) when several 
competing platforms apply single-homing 
[Calzolari, Denicolò, 2013]. This is because 
the platforms’ incentives to compete in-
tensely to attract single-homers are high. 
Third, multi-homing vs single-homing af-
fects the welfare effects of other business 
practices.
2.3. Justifications of Exclusionary 
Conduct
The origin of the positive cross-platform 
effect is important to develop an efficiency 
defense for seemingly anticompetitive con-
duct. Theory and empirical evidence [Cal-
zo la ri, Denicolò, 2013; Lee, 2013] support 
pro-competitive justification for vertical 
restraints resulting in exclusivity when the 
sector is sufficiently competitive. To be com-
petitive, a smaller platform might use ver-
tical restraints to achieve critical mass and 
“get the ball rolling”. In contrast, the ef-
ficiency defense for vertical restraints or 
similar policies of a dominant platform 
should address the origin of cross-platform 
effects. For transaction platforms, such as 
hotel booking platforms for example, the 
exclusivity clause might be the cheapest 
means of avoiding free-riding, in which par-
ties use the information and contacts avail-
able through one platform before completing 
the transaction either on another platform 
or by contacting the other side directly.
For digital platforms, additional justifi-
cations arise because of the Schumpeterian 
nature of competition in the sector. In dig-
ital markets, competition often takes the 
form of envelopment [Eisenmann, Parker, 
Van Alstyne, 2011], also known as drastic 
innovation, in which a new technology com-
pletely crowds out the previous one. In such 
cases, the meaningful competition is for the 
market rather than in the market.
3. uNRESOLVED AND 
PROBLEMATIC ISSuES  
IN COMPETITION POLICY 
TOWARDS MuLTI-SIDED 
PLATFORMS
A brief survey of economic models highlights 
several groups of implications for competi-
tion policy, including content of analysis, 
analytical tools and policy instruments. We 
begin with the first group — type of analy-
sis that competition authorities should un-
dertake. Firstly, the effects of a particular 
conduct by a MSP depend on market struc-
ture and share on all sides of the platform. 
Moreover, the same conduct (e. g., single-
homing) may be pro-competitive for smaller 
platforms but anticompetitive for the domi-
nant one. Therefore an effect-based approach 
should be applied towards digital MSPs [Kat-
soulacos, Avdasheva, Golovanova, 2016].
Secondly, it is difficult to distinguish 
between the deterrent effect of cross-plat-
form network externalities and the effects 
of exclusionary conditions in MSPs’ con-
tracts. If the latter takes place, it can have 
significant welfare losses, both static (high-
er price level) and dynamic (worsening entry 
555Does competition enforcement prevent competitive strategies of digital platforms: evidence from BRICS
РЖМ 17 (4): 547–568 (2019)
conditions and therefore a decrease of incen-
tives to innovate by entrant).
Finally, in the competition jurisdictions 
where legislation addresses not only exclu-
sionary but also exploitative abuses, sustain-
able dominance of an MSP makes exploita-
tion of users possible. In terms of value 
chain theory (VCT), MSPs dominate over 
their respective value chains [Bou dreau, 
Hagiu, 2009], elaborating and enforcing 
rules of transactions between users on dif-
ferent sides of platforms.
Performing important tasks within the 
value chain, an MSP might be interested in 
redistribution of the value created within 
the chain and even in preventing the upgrad-
ing of value chain participants [Gawer, 2011; 
Gawer, Cusumano, 2014; Muzellec, Ronteau, 
Lambkin, 2015]. There is not always a clear 
borderline between efficient value chain gov-
ernance and what competition law calls ex-
ploitative abuses. This specific nature of the 
MSPs’ position towards value chain allows 
for many theories of harm.
A second group of implications concerns 
the analytical tools available to the compe-
tition authorities. The bad news is the low 
discriminatory power of the tests, which 
authorities usually apply to “normal” mar-
kets. If applied mindlessly to MSPs, these 
tests would result in either a high probabil-
ity of wrongful convictions (Type I errors) 
or wrongful acquittals (Type II errors).
As we have mentioned above, below-cost 
pricing on one side of a platform cannot 
indicate predatory intent. Correspondingly, 
cost-based tests on for excessive pricing on 
one side of a platform also lose discrimina-
tory power, as a high price on one side of 
the platform might be the necessary com-
pensation for low or even negative prices 
on another side [Katsoulacos, Jenny, 2018]. 
The same can be true for other types of 
exploitative conduct. Taking into account 
the fact that profit-maximizing vector of 
prices for the clients of platforms implies 
a kind of “cross-subsidization”, any bench-
marking analysis is extremely difficult, if 
possible.
Other traditional competition policy in-
struments and techniques might also be more 
difficult to apply. For example, the notion 
of “profit sacrifice” or “no economic sense” 
tests cannot be applied to a single side of 
the MSP or even to a limited subset of the 
sides in which the MSPs are involved. Ap-
plying the test to a single side would risk 
concluding that there is a profit sacrifice 
even though the lower margins on that side 
help to generate higher margins on another 
side, without any profit sacrifice overall. An 
“equally efficient test” for any exclusionary 
agreements is also difficult to apply for 
MSPs. Since the main source of efficiency 
is size as a driver of network externalities, 
an “equally efficient” competitor should be 
a competitor of equal size of network. Even 
a mental experiment of that kind is extreme-
ly difficult to conduct as network benefits 
can be hard to value. The dynamic nature 
of platform markets add to the difficulties 
faced by competition authorities. On the 
one hand, large share does not guarantee 
automatically equate dominance in terms of 
an ability to influence the market unilater-
ally10. On the other hand, if vertical re-
straints prevent entry, this situation may 
induce substantial welfare losses in dynam-
ic markets. In particular, with potential 
drastic innovation, dominance might be 
short-lived. However, the main MSPs have 
been there for quite a few years now. The 
possibility of drastic innovation does not 
imply lack of dominance in terms of unilat-
eral static effect. It only does if the prob-
ability of drastic innovation itself increases 
when the MSP follow a particular conduct 
(say raise prices).
For exploitative abuses, additional com-
plications arise when the competition au-
thority selects a benchmark for comparison. 
One of the implications of VCT is that a do-
minant MSP may impose ‘unfair’ contract 
10 There are many examples in platform busi-
nesses in which a seemingly dominant company was 
crowded out of the market due to drastic techno-
logical innovation [Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne, 
2011].
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terms. However, standards of fairness are 
very difficult to follow anyway11. Difference 
between MSP and traditional business mod-
el brings additional complications. Straight-
for ward comparisons might be misleading. 
Taxi drivers under an MSP business model 
obtain substantially lower earnings per hour 
than do comparable taxi drivers in tradi-
tional taxi companies. Uber, Gett or Yandex 
Taxi for instance internalize transaction 
costs for both types of users — passengers 
and taxi drivers. In this respect, taxi ser-
vices provided by an MSP differ from those 
provided by independent drivers. The same 
is true for drivers. As a result, comparison 
between per hour earnings would be possible 
only by taking transaction costs into ac-
count, which is extremely difficult. Return 
on capital would also be compared with great 
caution: under MSP business model risk 
both of aggregators and taxi drivers differs 
with the risk level of traditional taxi ser-
vices, to be compared with. These complica-
tions are not particularly specific to MSP, 
but they require sophisticated comparison 
of risks, returns, prices etc.
Unfortunately, the difficulty in support-
ing a theory of harm for MSPs does not 
mean that particular MSPs never adopt an-
ticompetitive conduct, as the efficiency ex-
planation of large size suggests. On the 
contrary, MSPs from Microsoft to Google 
have extensive records of exclusionary con-
duct [Baseman, Warren-Boulton, Woroch, 
1995; Economides, 2001; Lévêque, 2005; 
Akman, 2018; Amelio, Karlinger, Valletti, 
2018].
Sufficient evidence on the absence of an-
ticompetitive conduct of an MSP on inter-
platform competition is an absence of any 
restrictions on multi-homing, naked or con-
structive. However, regardless of the busi-
ness practice of the MSP, such evidence is 
valid only in cases where multi-homing is 
technically available, economically reason-
11 See, for instance, on the issue of fairness 
under European enforcement against excessive pric-
ing [Jenny, 2018].
able and is not hampered by behavioral bi-
ases on the part of users if multi-homing 
is possible, it also prevents exploitative abus-
es. If several taxi aggregator services com-
pete, they compete not only for final cus-
tomers but also for drivers. The probability 
of keeping drivers’ compensation at a fair 
level increases under competition.
A third group of implications addresses 
the appropriate instruments of competition 
policy towards MSPs. If competition law 
and economics cannot provide a reliable set 
of tests to distinguish between lawful and 
unlawful conduct, the two remaining ex-
treme options are nonintervention and sec-
tor-specific regulation. Sector-specific regu-
lation for MSPs may emerge outside com-
petition policy. For instance, there was 
a  recent discussion on data as an essential 
facility that platforms obtain [Graef, 2016; 
Graef, Wahyuningtyas, Valcke, 2015], with 
strong arguments both pro and con [Tucker, 
2019]. International experience shows that 
the issues of market power over data might 
be addressed in different ways, including 
FRAND rules, widely applicable in the EU 
[Heim, Nikolic, 2019], or by establishing 
explicit property rights on personal data, 
which would allow data portability [Takiga-
wa, 2018].
Advantages of the alternative solutions 
are that they do not rely on the premise 
that the assets of an MSP are essential fa-
cilities or that an MSP is a natural monop-
oly. In turn, this premise is not always easy 
to support. The boundary between “natural 
monopoly” and “contestable market of one 
seller” is a threat of new entry or envelop-
ment. In some MSP markets, threat of new 
entry emerges because of quite similar use 
of applications. For instance, taxi aggrega-
tors and aggregators of food delivery work 
in similar way. In many markets that plat-
forms use geolocations, entry on other mar-
ket is possible and does not require high 
fixed costs. Envelopment may emerge in 
similar way, by developing of a particular 
digital decision for another purposes. Un-
fortunately, the probability of envelopment 
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often can be observed only ex-post but not 
ex-ante.
Limitations of the sector-specific regula-
tion option follow from the dynamic and 
innovative nature of digital platforms. Many 
business practices still lack consistent as-
sessment in terms of their impact on com-
petition. Regulatory rules being fairly elab-
orated in procedural terms may not achieve 
desired objectives, but they can easily pro-
vide unexpected spillovers. One intermedi-
ate option for competition authority is to 
develop a code of fair business practice12. 
A  code of fair conduct permits engaging 
a targeted protection group in the elabora-
tion of rules and then combining a broad 
description of principles with industry ex-
pertise in conflict resolution.
4. COMPETITION POLICY 
TOWARDS MuLTI-SIDED 
MARKETS IN BRICS
In this section, we summarize the records 
of competition enforcement in BRICS coun-
tries. BRICS group consists of countries 
with relatively young competition jurisdic-
tions. Recent laws in force were adopted 
from 1999 in South Africa to 2011 in Brazil. 
Countries follow different paths of the de-
velopment of competition in digital markets, 
from China, were after “Great Firewall” 
domestic platforms flourish within and be-
yond national borders, to Brazil that is open 
towards international platforms. Until re-
cently, countries from BRICS group, exclud-
ing China, accumulated experience of com-
petition enforcement towards digital plat-
forms. In the investigations of many conducts 
of MSPs, including Google Shop ping and 
12 In Russia, codes of fair conduct are developed 
in many industries where there are concerns, first, 
about exploitative conduct of dominant companies. 
At the time of submission of this article, a code 
of fair practice for supplier-retailer contracting, 
a  code of conduct for auto-makers and their deal-
ers, and a code of fair practice in the pharmaceu-
tical industry are in force.
Google Android cases, decisions of BRICS 
authorities preceded similar decisions of 
European Commission.
4.1. Market Definition and Multi-sided 
Markets
BRICS competition authorities usually apply 
different approaches to transaction vs non-
transaction platforms. For transactions plat-
forms (occasionally called aggregators  — 
see, for instance, the decision on the Uber-
Yandex merger)13, the affected markets are 
defined as platform services. However, the 
digital nature of a platform does not always 
serve as a feature that defines the market. 
For instance, in Uber-Yandex mergers [FAS 
Russia, 2019], the Russian FAS considers 
“traditional aggregating taxi services” to be 
a substitute for a mobile platform that be-
longs to the same markets.
The Brazilian CADE follows the same 
path in the assessment of the competitive 
effect of Uber’s entry into Brazilian mu-
nicipal markets. Independent taxi services 
are considered competitors in the same mar-
kets, affected by Uber’s entry. In both the 
Russian and Brazilian cases, a transaction 
between users defines the market.
In the case of non-transaction platforms 
(e. g. Facebook, Google), authorities gener-
ally consider several distinct markets, inter-
related within the platform. For instance, 
13 Concept of aggregators vs platforms are wide-
ly explored in strategic management. A distinction 
is that participants in the value chain of aggrega-
tors do not contribute to the value that the ag-
gregator provides. In contrast, a “genuine plat-
form” in its business benefits from the value cre-
ated by the users. Therefore, for the aggregators, 
in contrast to platforms, there are no special incen-
tives to invest in development of the users. Without 
disputing this distinction, even “pure aggregators” 
such as online taxi services assist their users in 
promoting competitiveness. From the perspectives 
of competition law and economics, the distinction 
between aggregators and platforms seems to be not 
very important, even if is important for strategic 
management. In both cases, network effects explain 
market structure and efficiencies in the market.
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in the case of distorted search results, the 
Competition Commission of India defines 
two markets: Online General Web Search in 
India and Web Search Advertising Services 
in India [Competition Commission of India, 
2012]. Considering the alleged restrictions 
on multi-homing in sponsored search market, 
CADE also does not include the other side 
of the platform in the market [CADE, 2013]. 
In the Android case, the Russian FAS con-
sidered that Google was dominant in the 
markets for Operating Systems market, in 
the Application Store market [FAS Russia, 
2015], and the affected adjacent markets 
pre-installation of applications, products, 
services, where OEMs are buyers and ap-
plication developers are sellers14.
4.2. Theories of Harm
4.2.1. Exclusionary conduct  
through vertical foreclosure
Vertical foreclosure is at the center of the 
theories of harm in the investigations of 
MSPs. Some business practices might be 
considered naked exclusion of competing 
services [Google Android Russia, 2015] or 
foreclosure through the limitation on con-
tract terms to other potential counterpar-
ties through price-parity conditions.
4.2.2. Exclusionary conduct through other 
forms of competition softening
Discrimination is another means of compe-
tition softening involving MSPs (see [Com-
pe ti tion Commission of India, 2012]). Dis-
cri mination in terms of access to customers’ 
attention, “clicks” and traffic substantially 
affects the competitiveness of products. To 
our knowledge, no decision of a BRICS com-
petition authority contains a quantitative 
14 Under appeal of the FAS decision, Google 
tries to challenge market definition by defining 
market more broadly as the market for software. 
An attempt to define the market in this way was 
rejected by a commercial court. The judge mentions, 
among other points, that this type of market defi-
nition does not allow identifying the source of 
market power and disguises abuses of dominance. 
assessment of the impact of search distor-
tion on the comparable competitiveness of 
suppliers towards final customers similar 
to the analysis performed by the Directorate 
General of the European Commission [Euro-
pean Commission, 2017a]. However, the un-
derlying logic of the decision is essentially 
the same. Standard of legal conduct in this 
case is “net neutrality”; a search engine is 
considered an essential facility that should 
bear specific responsibility to provide fair 
contract terms to competitors15.
4.2.3. Exploitative conduct  
in a value chain perspective
No competition authority of a BRICS coun-
try has issued a decision on pure exploitative 
conduct by a digital platform similar to the 
decision of Bundeskartellamt on Facebook 
[Bundeskartellamt, 2019], where unfairness 
of contract terms with the final customer is 
sufficient condition for illegality.
From a value chain perspective, theories 
of harm applied to competition violations 
and to merger approval correspond can be 
“exploitative” in the sense that (1) restric-
tions of competition prevent upgrading of 
the participants along the same value chain, 
and (2) upgrading of the participants in the 
adjacent markets can be expropriated by the 
platform. The effect of expropriation (re-
distribution) of rent is articulated in the 
value chain perspective. If counterparties 
increase efficiency and reduce cost, the gov-
erning party decreases the compensation 
without passthrough to the final customers. 
One can use dominance at one or more stag-
es of the vertical chain to expropriate the 
surplus of others in other stages and this 
reduces/eliminates these targeted firms’ in-
centives to innovate [Farrell, Katz, 2000]. 
To our knowledge, no competition author-
ity explicitly includes this theory of harm 
as central in its decision. In the decisions 
on [FAS Russia, 2015], the Russian compe-
15 On the alternative approaches to theory of 
harm in Google search cases see [Iacobucci, Ducci, 
2019].
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tition authority mentions potential losses 
of application developers that receive lower 
fees that they could when competition in 
the application stores market takes place.
Generally, if competition law and econom-
ics apply the value chain theory instead of 
the (mostly) neoclassical notion of market 
dominance, a relevant exploitative theory 
of harm would be either prevention of up-
grading or unfair redistribution of rent [Da-
vis, Kaplinsky, Morris, 2018].
“Vertical fairness” in this context means 
contract terms that do not prevent upgrad-
ing of the participants of adjacent markets 
by expropriation of rents that parties may 
obtain for superior productivity. Different 
theories acknowledge the possibility of the 
gains obtained by cost reduction of quality 
improving to be expropriated. The theory 
of incomplete contracts develops a frame-
work of relationship-specific investments and 
appropriable quasi-rent [Klein, Crawford, 
Alchian, 1978]16. There is however an im-
portant obstacle to building the theory of 
harm using an incomplete contract frame-
work. Hold-up theory predicts that a ratio-
nal independent agent would not be willing 
to invest in relationship-specific assets un-
der the threat of hold-up. In the incomplete 
contract theory, the underinvestment prob-
lem is resolved by vertical integration or 
FRAND commitments, and vertical integra-
tion resolves the problem of rent expropri-
ation. In the context of dominant platform 
businesses, participants in adjacent markets 
might be locked into the contractual rela-
tionship so that their rents are appropri-
ated by platforms. However, in a pure frame-
16 An interesting parallel between the theory 
of appropriable quasi-rent and definition of plat-
form in strategic management is the notion of co-
operative relation-specific investments [Che, Ha-
usch, 1999]. Cooperative investments are those 
that, first, are relationship-specific, and, second, 
benefit the partner of the investor but not investor 
himself. This benefit is exactly the effect of the 
investments of the participants in a market adja-
cent to the platform if we distinguish between 
platform and aggregator. 
work of incomplete contracts, it would be 
difficult to explain how the lock-in emerges, 
if a rational counterparty does not invest 
or invests insufficiently under the threat of 
hold-up. Normative analysis shows the im-
pact of potential hold up on the investment 
to upgrading but it would be extremely dif-
ficult to find positive evidence in favor of 
the hypothesis on the negative impact of 
potential hold up on competition.
Generally, discussing this issue is avoid-
ed in the modern literature on global value 
chains. Providing extensive evidence of fi-
nancialization [Milberg, 2008a, 2008b; Mil-
berg, Winkler, 2011], that is, appropriation 
of the cost reduction and quality improve-
ment of the subordinated firms in the value 
chain by the lead one, authors do not provide 
an explanation of the efforts and invest-
ments of the first group.
This notion of exploitation differs from 
exclusionary theories of harm that competi-
tion enforcement applies even in very pro-
regulatory regimes such as Russia. It is not 
yet a part of a notion of exploitative antitrust 
violations. The closest is low monopolistic 
price in Russian competition law, where low 
monopolistic price is the contract price paid 
by dominant buyer. There are no instances 
of the application of low monopolistic price 
towards MSPs. Similarly, decisions do not 
apply the notion of abuse of economic depen-
dence [Bougette, Budzinski, Marty, 2018]17.
If we nevertheless would develop a theory 
of harm using some version of incomplete 
contract and/or global value chain framework, 
it seems to be necessary, first, to acknowledge 
the unequal bargaining power of the seem-
ingly independent parties. The explanation 
of the incentives and instruments of abuse 
would then be directly borrowed from the 
global value chain concept. The lead firm is 
17 For Russian competition law, the explanation 
of the absence of a specific notion of economic de-
pendence is that the notion of market dominance 
in the practice of enforcement captures the idea of 
strong dependence. In some extreme cases, compe-
tition authorities define market boundaries as bi-
lateral relationships [Avdasheva, 2016].
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able to appropriate rents accumulated by sub-
ordinated parties until there is a better out-
side option. Recall that it is only the lead 
firm in contrast to a subordinated one that 
has outside options. Competing to be the bet-
ter outside option that is the only one that 
is able to keep the rent, subordinated firms 
allow for the lead firm to appropriate the 
gains they create. In the neoclassic analogue 
of this framework, welfare losses are the 
losses of distributional efficiency due to in-
creasing inequality in the economy.
If we start from this point, then the 
evidence of abuse would be a large pass-
through of the investments of the partici-
pants in adjacent markets on the profits of 
the lead firm. Until now, no competition 
regimes, including interventionist ones, is 
ready to go that far. Even if we accept the 
point that the rent appropriation in par-
ticular circumstances is possible (in the 
world of incomplete contracts with imper-
fectly informed users of platforms), and the 
asymmetric pass-through is an indicator of 
exploitative abuse (in terms of competition 
economy), the issue of measurement and 
comparison of this pass-through is hardly 
resolved. A similar issue arises in the at-
tempts to enforce against excessive pricing. 
In Europe, an excessive price includes the 
characteristics of “unfairness”. However, 
four decades of enforcement have not allowed 
elaborating the proper threshold of “fair-
ness”. A pass-through of efficiency gains 
from investments is much more difficult to 
decide on. As for excessive pricing, there is 
no proper threshold for a “fair” distribution 
of gains. Additionally, in contrast to the 
excessive pricing, the pass-through of ef-
ficiency gains is not directly observable.
4.3. Efficiencies and Multi-sided 
Markets
Antitrust decisions towards MSP in BRICS 
rarely contain explicit assessments of effi-
ciencies. One formal reason is that presumed 
violations of MSPs are more often illegal per 
se. For instance, tying of pre-installed ap-
plications with restrictions of pre-installa-
tion of competing applications [FAS Rus sia, 
2015] is illegal per se. Another limitation on 
efficiency analysis arises from the fact that 
national authorities, when analyzing welfare 
effects, concentrate only on domestic mar-
kets. Under the global presence of a digital 
MSP, efficiencies captured by a  platform 
would be missing from the analysis.
Under antitrust enforcement, an excep-
tion is the analysis of Most-Favored Nation 
(MFN) clause as a device to prevent free-
riding towards a platform by the hotels in 
the CADE investigation in Booking/Expe-
dia/Decolar [CADE, 2018a]. CADE mentions 
that the threat of freeriding may destroy 
the positive welfare effects of a business 
model that minimizes transaction costs for 
the customers; therefore, efficiencies follow 
from the transaction-cost minimization.
In turn, there are examples of effect as-
sessment, including efficiencies, in the deci-
sions on mergers and ex-post evaluation of 
entry. An example of the latter is the as-
sessment of UBER entry in Brazilian mu-
nicipal markets during 2014–2016 [CADE, 
2018b]. Ex-post analysis, which becomes 
important under discussions on proposed 
regulations of the taxi applications market, 
was concentrated on two main effects: price 
(fares) and entry conditions (measured by 
the quantity supplied by competitors). There-
fore, the CADE approach addresses both 
final customers (passengers) and the effects 
on competitors. For the latter, CADE poses 
the question of whether a platform crowds 
out “traditional” transactions. Under the 
approval of the Yandex-Uber merger in Rus-
sia [FAS Russia, 2017a], FAS discussed si-
milar evidence on decreases of fare per ki-
lometer and changes in the number of rides 
by independent taxi services.
4.4. Competition Remedies
Remedies normally appear under merger ap-
proval. In some BRICS countries, especial-
ly Russia, remedies are also issued under 
infringement decisions and as a part of so-
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called warnings and precautions — specific 
procedures to suggest commitment to stop 
illegal conducts in exchange for the termi-
nation of investigation.
4.4.1. Remedies promoting interplatform 
competition
A typical remedy promoting interplatform 
competition is the support of the right of 
users to multi-home. This support was the 
most important remedy under the Yandex-
Uber merger in Russia [FAS Russia, 2017a]. 
Indian Competition Commission in 2012, in 
the Shopping case, ordered Google not to 
apply restrictive clauses in its negotiated 
direct search intermediation agreements 
with Indian partners. Remedies are aimed 
not only at naked restrictions on multi-
homing but also at indirect restrictions. An 
example is the commitment decision of Bra-
zilian CADE in the Booking/Expedia/De-
colar case [CADE, 2018a], where online tra-
vel agencies agreed to stop using a price-
parity clause policy and renounce the condi-
tions imposed on hotels that offer accom-
modations on their platforms.
Remedies for multi-homing tend to pro-
tect competition between MSPs, which is 
horizontal competition. Nevertheless, they 
may also affect vertical competition by lim-
iting the unilateral bargaining power of 
particular digital platforms in their relation-
ships with participants in adjacent markets. 
From a value chain perspective, the protec-
tion of multi-homing is very important, 
although not necessarily sufficient, to pro-
tect upgrading opportunities. In particular, 
in the investigation of Booking/Expedia/
Decolar, CADE specifically stresses the ad-
verse effect of MFN clauses on the abilities 
of other agencies to enter the market and 
the distribution of rents between hotels and 
online travel agencies.
4.4.2. Remedies promoting intraplatform 
competition
In turn, remedies on fair access terms di-
rectly affect the bargaining position of plat-
form users. They try to promote the ability 
of competing “unbundled” sellers in adja-
cent markets to supply their services using 
the capacities of the platform. Typically, 
this type of remedy addresses the issue of 
discrimination towards competing market 
participants by MSPs. In the simplest ver-
sion, this type of remedy is presented by 
the settlement decision of Google with Rus-
sian FAS, in which Google voids the exclu-
sionary clause of its Android applications 
and commits not to encourage original equip-
ment manufacturers (OEMs hereafter) to 
install only Google applications [FAS Rus-
sia, 2017b]. Thus, competing sellers can take 
advantage of using Android OS under con-
ditions that are typical to essential facilities 
that are subjects of specific access rules, 
being a bottleneck in the markets.
Remedies in the Google Search case in 
India address the ability of all noncaptive 
participants in adjacent markets to be pre-
sented in the search results in a search en-
gine as a platform. The decision explicitly 
states: “… as Google has the ability and the 
incentive to abuse its dominant position, 
its “special responsibility” is critical in en-
suring not only the fairness of the online 
web search and search advertising markets 
but also the fairness of all online markets, 
given that these are primarily accessed 
through search engines” [Competition Com-
mission of India, 2012, p. 79]. Relevant re-
medial requirements should display a dis-
claimer on the commercial flight unit box 
that clearly states that the “search flights” 
link at the bottom leads to Google’s Flights 
page rather than the results aggregated by 
any other third-party service provider, so 
that users are not misled.
Clauses that directly promote intraplat-
form competition also appear in decisions 
on mergers. Such decisions may address ma-
ny adjacent markets, even without a spe-
cific analysis of competition concerns. For 
example, MOFCOM in Google-Motorola merg-
er [MOFCOM, 2012] specifies rather general 
conditions for business practice in China:
•	 maintain free Android open source licens-
ing for 5 years;
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•	 maintain nondiscriminatory access to its 
Android system for 5 years;
•	 continue licensing Motorola Mobility pat-
ents on a fair, reasonable and nondis-
criminatory (FRAND) basis.
Generally, remedies addressing intraplat-
form contracts directly support vertical but 
not horizontal competition. They concen-
trate on the objective of preserving compe-
tition in adjacent rather than platform mar-
kets.
Being criticized for the extensive use of 
remedies, which are normally a part of reg-
ulation, not antitrust enforcement, Russian 
FAS sometimes succeeds to promote non-
discriminatory competition in a timely man-
ner. A recent example is Microsoft’s allega-
tion of discrimination against competing 
developers of anti-malware software. This 
case concerned Microsoft’s policies on the 
advance provision to competing software 
developers of so-called “release to manufac-
turing” (or RTM) versions of its Windows 10 
OS. Timely access to RTM OS versions is 
required to allow competing developers to 
update their anti-malware products to en-
sure compatibility with a new OS before its 
release. Kaspersky Lab, one of the largest 
Russian anti-malware developers, submitted 
a complaint to the FAS, alleging that Micro-
soft provided the RTM version of Windows 10 
to competing anti-malware developers only 
six days before the new OS was released. 
Moreover, Microsoft allegedly designed its 
Windows Defender security feature in a man-
ner to induce users to favor Microsoft’s own 
anti-malware products over those offered by 
competitors. The FAS found Microsoft’s 
conduct to amount to an abuse of dominance 
by creating discriminatory conditions for 
rivals. The investigation did not result in 
an infringement decision, because after re-
ceiving a formal warning complemented by 
remedies, Microsoft decided to comply with 
the warning’s requirements.
Until recently, the potential scope of 
remedies in Russia is limited by safe harbor 
on intellectual property rights (IPRs). After 
the proposed amendments of the law “On 
protection of competition” that would re-
move this safe harbor one may expect more 
remedies aimed to protect intra-platform 
competition, with a large capacity to influ-
ence potential strategies of digital plat-
forms. Chinese competition law enforcement 
provides an important example of the rem-
edies applied to Qualcomm that regulate the 
terms and conditions of IPR licensing [Al-
len, Overy, 2015].
4.4.3. Remedies affecting competition 
outside competition law
Regulatory interventions that affect com-
petition in the markets do not necessarily 
use traditional tools of competition policy 
within competition legislation. Restrictions 
for foreign-originated platforms due to the 
specific requirements for the collection and 
use of data have an important stimulating 
effect on domestic competing platforms. The 
development of Baidu, AliBaba and Tencent 
in China was supported by specific require-
ments for data protection and data sharing. 
The China Operating System, if successful, 
will be another example of an alternative 
approach to competition development in 
BRICS.
There is no consistent assessment of the 
economic effects of the Chinese model of 
competition protection. Recently, however, 
in the Chinese markets adjacent to digital 
platforms (such as advertising, online video, 
music, B2C and O2O commerce, mobile pay-
ment and logistic, etc.), there is competition 
between the platforms that necessarily ben-
efits participants of these adjacent markets.
In Russia, a draft of the law that should 
affect vertical competition between plat-
forms and adjacent markets outside the 
scope of traditional competition enforcement 
was issued at the beginning of 2019. The 
proposed changes to the Russian law “On 
communications” require for all mobile de-
vices imported into Russia, first, domestic 
applications (including antivirus, browser, 
messenger and geolocation) should be pre-
installed; second, all pre-installed applica-
tions developed by foreign companies should 
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be removable. The expected effect is the 
redistribution of rents created in the value 
chain of the digital platform towards do-
mestic application developers. However, this 
type of requirements is much closer to com-
petition remedies promoting intraplatform 
competition and a supporting model of in-
dependent development of domestic digital 
platforms.
5. CONCLuSIONS  
AND IMPLICATIONS
In the last decade, BRICS competition au-
thorities have obtained records on competi-
tion enforcement towards MSPs. Under en-
forcement of competition legislation, theo-
ries of harm in investigations and decisions 
are mostly of an exclusionary, not exploit-
ative nature. Discrimination and tying are 
typical qualifications of anticompetitive con-
duct. Exclusionary effects constitute com-
petition concerns under merger approval. 
Until recently, few contained quantitative 
assessments of effects — but such assess-
ments do not differentiate substantially 
between BRICS competition decisions and 
decisions in mature jurisdictions.
No restriction on multi-homing is a uni-
versal remedy under both investigations 
of  infringements and merger notifications. 
Special attention to vertical restraints with 
exclusionary effects reflects post-Chicago 
law and economics concerns about incentives 
to restrict competition. In this respect, the 
approach of BRICS contradicts neither the 
economic theory of competition in platform 
markets nor the practice of developed coun-
tries. An important gap in the decisions is 
the efficiency defense; competition author-
ities rarely undertake this type of analysis. 
It seems that neither do companies under 
enforcement try to develop this line of de-
fense. Decisions on MSPs in BRICS rarely 
use a specific economic theory of platform 
competition (if any do so at all). They most-
ly rely on the standard theory of competi-
tion.
The economic theory of platforms does 
not exclude exploitative theories of harm. 
How ever, BRICS competition authorities do 
not apply them. In this context, the approach 
to identify potentially illegal actions is not 
harsher than in EU competition authorities. 
Moreover, until recently, no competition 
authority applied competition legislation 
against exploitative abuses of dominance 
by MSPs in the manner that Bundeskakrtel-
lamt does.
It does not necessarily mean that BRICS 
competition authorities do not intend to 
protect domestic participants of the markets 
adjacent to platforms. However, they con-
sider protection of multi-homing as most 
efficient tools to prevent exploitations of 
business users. It seems unlikely that BRICS 
competition authorities in the nearest future 
will apply specific policies to protect private 
users, the same way as Bundeskartellamt 
in the decision on Facebook does.
At the same time, BRICS authorities ap-
ply broad standards of competition as a bench-
mark of legal conducts. In addition, recent 
competition enforcement towards MSPs shows 
that authorities successfully share their ex-
perience. Not only BRICS authorities adopt 
the approaches suggested in mature jurisdic-
tions, but also vice versa.
BRICS competition enforcement may 
substantially influence the business models 
of platforms. In order to avoid competition 
enforcement, dominant platforms should 
avoid anticompetitive conducts, first of all, 
single-homing, unless it has pronounced 
reasons not related to anticompetitive in-
tensions. In markets where competition 
between platforms takes place, rivals of 
platforms may obtain protection from busi-
ness stealing due to unreasonable single-
homing requirements. In markets where 
competition takes place on the platform, 
it is more difficult to find a clear criterion 
to discriminate competition on the merits 
from exclusionary conducts in many cir-
cumstances. However, competition on plat-
forms may also be protected by competition 
enforcement.
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Сдерживает ли антимонопольная политика конкурентные стратегии цифровых 
платформ: практика БРИКС
С. Б. Авдашева
Факультет экономических наук Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая 
школа экономики», Россия
Д. В. Корнеева
Факультет экономики Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа 
экономики» в Нижнем Новгороде, Россия
Конкурентные стратегии платформ часто включают в себя систему контрактов, которые мо-
гут рассматриваться в качестве антиконкурентных. В результате решений Европейской ко-
миссии в отношении Google (2017 и 2018 гг.) и Федерального антимонопольного ведомства 
Германии (Bundeskartellamt) в отношении Facebook (2019 г.) стандарты ответственности за 
злоупотребления, применяемые антимонопольными органами, будут влиять на бизнес-моде-
ли цифровых платформ. В статье рассмотрены объяснения антиконкурентных эффектов, 
накладываемые органами конкурентной политики БРИКС применительно к многосторонним 
платформам. Предполагается, что подход БРИКС является более жестким по сравнению со 
зрелыми юрисдикциями (в первую очередь Европейским cоюзом). Однако проведенный ана-
лиз свидетельствует о том, что в центре внимания антимонопольных расследований БРИКС 
были те же самые вопросы дискриминации и связанных продаж с исключающими эффекта-
ми. При этом предписания в рассмотренных решениях о нарушении антимонопольного за-
конодательства призваны защитить конкуренцию путем обязательств неисключительного 
использования платформ (multi-homing). Также нельзя утверждать, что антимонопольные 
органы БРИКС применяют какую-то особую экономическую теорию многосторонних плат-
форм. Исключительная важность представленных выводов объясняется тем, что в силу раз-
мера целевых рынков антимонопольные органы БРИКС могут препятствовать практике 
вытеснения платформами друг друга с мирового рынка.
Ключевые слова: многосторонняя платформа, конкурентная политика, правоприменение, 
объяснения антиконкурентных эффектов, БРИКС.
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